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ABSTRACT: During World War II, the United States implemented programs to exploit hundreds 
of raw materials in Latin America, many of them botanical. This required the participation of 
the country’s scientific community and marked the beginning of intervention in Latin Ame-
rican countries characterized by the active participation of the United States in negotiations 
(and not only by private firms supported by the United States). Many federal institutions and 
companies were created, others were adapted, and universities, research centers and pharma-
ceutical companies were contracted. The programs undertaken by this coalition of institutions 
served to build and consolidate the dependence of Latin American countries on United States 
technology, to focus their economies on the extraction and development of resources that 
the United States could not obtain at home (known as «complementary») and to impede the 
development of competition. Latin American republics had been historically dependant on 
raw material exports (minerals and plants). But during World War II their dependence on US 
loans, markets, science and technology reached record levels. One example of this can be 
appreciated through a careful examination of the Cinchona Program, implemented in the 
1940s by US agencies in Latin America. This program for the extraction of a single medicinal 
plant, apart from representing a new model of scientific imperialism (subsequently renamed 
«scientific cooperation») was the most intensive and extensive scientific exploration of a single 
medicinal plant in the history of mankind. 
KEY WORDS: Cinchona, Andean countries, Latin America, botanical explorations, scientific 
imperialism.
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1. Introduction
The history of scientific expeditions, sent from the northern kingdoms, 
empires, states and metropolis to the tropical areas of the planet, has served 
to illustrate how these enterprises have been instrumental in initiating or 
strengthening the dominance of new territories in Asia, Africa and America. 
The literature on these expeditions is abundant, especially for the Spanish, 
French and British since the sixteenth century onwards, but analyses about 
United States’ scientific expeditions during the mid-twentieth century are 
less frequent, and in cases such as the one studied here, they are inexis-
tent. Examination of these cases is essential to obtaining new insights into 
the complex international relations with regard to science, and how those 
relations evolve in a particular time and region. The Cinchona Program, 
implemented by US agencies in Latin America in the 1940s, is a very good 
case for exploration of this issue.
This paper examines an enterprise aimed at obtaining a group of me-
dicinal plants well known to the history of science and medicine: members 
of the genus Cinchona. This case illustrates another instance of exploration 
of the tropics, embedded in the tradition of dominating labor and tropical 
nature through travel and the accumulation of information in the form of 
herbarium specimens, field notes, maps, drawings, seeds and plants. The 
novelty of the Cinchona Program (and the reason it deserves scholarly 
attention) is the size in terms of people involved and the volume of raw 
materials and information obtained. In the extensive history of Cinchona, 
the chapter on the US Cinchona Program is missing, despite it being the 
most intensive and extensive scientific exploration ever made of Cinchona, 
and of any other medicinal plant, in the history of humankind.
The paper also identifies the emergence of a new model of interna-
tional scientific enterprise, a model that was consolidated and commonly 
applied in subsequent decades. The model is characterized by pronounced 
dependence on loans and non refundable aid; scientists to explore, negotiate 
and ultimately lead the work; the involvement of federal agencies with the 
bilateral cooperation of southern counterparts; and close relations with 
universities, pharmaceutical companies and research centers. As the United 
States did not have the same agency that the Spanish had enjoyed in Latin 
America (the attributes of a formal empire), it had to negotiate certain 
aspects of the venture. A completely new approach had to be developed 
for encouraging and monopolizing botanical commodities production in 
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Latin America. The effort was a great success: the United States acquired 
privileges and power never before seen in its negotiations with all Latin 
American countries.
In addition, in the field of public health, as illustrated by several authors, 
US intervention during and after World War II left a lasting footprint in 
the American nations. Public health was targeted for even more training 
and investment, but what the programs really pursued was securing of US 
investment opportunities abroad and, later, cooperation against commu-
nist expansion, all under the guise of Pan-Americanism 1. A study of this 
cooperation in Brazil, for example, illustrates the different expectations of 
US and Brazilian governments: the former was interested in an immediate 
and clearly defined military objective, while the later was immersed in a 
«state and nation building» program 2.
In the field of agronomy, US technicians promoted the idea of lands 
without people with the knowledge needed to develop them; countries po-
pulated by ignorant peasants, a scheme that should be changed and modeled 
to the successful US model of agriculture. If, in the centuries before World 
War II, Latin American countries looked to Europe for their development/
scientific models, the strategies introduced by the United States served to 
change perceptions: now all eyes were focused, almost exclusively, on the 
science produced north of the Río Grande. 
The Cinchona Program also represents an important chapter in the 
history of the environment. It is the tip of the iceberg, just one of a com-
plex group of missions carried out in Latin America during World War 
II to exploit minerals, livestock, forest plants (balsa, quebracho, rubber, 
etc), and to promote the production of these and hundreds of others in 
frontier areas. The new ideas for agriculture, based on mechanization, 
the intensive use of external inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides, and 
oriented to complementary products, had a strong impact on nature and 
the agricultural frontier in Latin American. Again, this is not to say that 
previous interventions did not have an impact on tropical environments, 
or that US interventions had not shaped nature in Latin America or other 
areas before. Previous booms in tobacco, sugar and other commodities 
 1. Guzmán, María del Pilar; Emilio Quevedo. La cooperación técnica norteamericana en salud 
pública en Colombia durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Biomédica. 1999; 19 (1): 5-17. 
 2. Vieira de Campos, André Luis. La expansión de la autoridad estatal y el Servicio Especial de 
Salud Pública en el Brasil, 1942-1960. Dynamis. 2005; 25: 227-256.
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were huge, but the scale of the Cinchona Program remains, nevertheless, 
without precedent: in the 18th century, when the Spanish Kingdom exer-
cised a 38-year monopoly on Cinchona production, 350 thousand pounds 
of Cinchona were shipped to the Real Botica in Spain 3. By way of contrast, 
through the Cinchona Program, in about seven years, the United States 
imported around 40 million pounds of dry bark; this figure does not include 
the bark processed in Latin American factories. 
Far from entering a discussion or dialogue with works that analyze 
science and imperialism (a topic on which there is much literature) 4, or US 
imperialism and its relation with science and technology before and after 
World War II 5, the purpose of this paper is to call attention to a moment 
in which relations between the United States and Latin America related to 
«science and imperialism» acquired a new face within the «cooperation for 
development» framework. It is not my intention to downplay the importan-
ce of other US interventions in commodities production in Latin America 
(a topic that has been studied in the case of bananas, rubber, sugarcane, 
agricultural stations overseas, etc.) 6, nor to underestimate the relevance 
that other US scientific endeavors (such as in medicine) have had in Latin 
America. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the New 
York Botanical Garden, the Missouri Botanical Garden, the Field Museum 
of Natural History and other institutions had been sending «plant hunters» 
around the world to collect tropical plants since the early 20th century, 
resulting in massive collections. US scientists had been working around 
the world for many decades, but the number involved during the war, the 
support they received, and the kind of scientific cooperation established 
 3. De Andrés Turrión, María Luisa. Quina del Nuevo Mundo para la Corona española. Asclepio. 
1989; 41 (1): 305-324.
 4. For example: MacLeod, Roy. Introduction. Osiris. 2000; 15: 1-13; Palladino, Paolo; Worboys, 
Michael. Science and imperialism. Isis. 1993; 84 (1): 91-102.
 5. Cueto, Marcos, ed. Missionaries of Science. The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press; 1994; McCook, Stuart. States of 
nature: science, agriculture and environment in the Spanish Caribbean, 1760-1940. Austin: 
University of Texas Press; 2000; Krige, John; Barth, Kai-Henrik. Introduction: science, technol-
ogy, and international affairs. Osiris. 2006; 21: 1-21; Miller, Clark A. «An effective instrument 
of peace»: scientific cooperation as an instrument of US foreign policy, 1938-1950. Osiris. 
2006; 21: 133-160.
 6. Dean, Warren. Brazil and the Struggle for rubber: a study in environmental history. Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press; 1987; Soluri, John. Accounting for taste. Export 
bananas, mass markets, and Panama Disease. Environmental History. 2002; 7 (3): 386-410.
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with Latin America have no precedent. Indeed, overall from 1942 and 
under the umbrella of Inter-Americanism and hemispheric security, the 
United States began to participate in its neighbors’ domestic affairs in a 
way «never seen or imagined before» 7. 
Only two further preliminary explanations are needed, related to lo-
cal contexts. In this paper I deal not only with the United States but with 
Latin America, a complex undertaking. Latin American countries are very 
different from one another and each has its own unique history —features 
important to recognize and keep in mind. However, my aim is not to detail 
the complexity of local contexts, but to show that even in the light of those 
differences, continuities exist that come together to form the «big picture».
The second explanation has to do with the lack of Latin American ar-
chival sources quoted here. This could lead to the conclusion that national 
receptions and responses to US intervention in Latin American natural 
resources were weak or even nonexistent. Of course, this was not the case, 
and archival sources should be explored in the future. This article should be 
seen as a first approach to a topic that illustrates what was done from the 
metropolis. Future investigations should shed light on local and national 
reactions in the face of imperial attitudes 8.
2. Cinchona and its alkaloids
«Quinas» is the common Spanish name for the plants of the genus Cincho-
na, and a few of other genera, such as Remijia and Ladenbergia, that, like 
Cinchona, have medicinal, including antimalarial, properties. The potential 
of quinas for preventing and curing malaria comes from the alkaloids in 
their bark: cinchonine, cinchonidine, quinidine and quinine. Each species 
has different concentrations of alkaloids, and although quinine is the one 
preferred for fighting malaria, all can be used for this purpose. The mixture 
of all four alkaloids is called totaquine. 
For four centuries, these plants have been known by hundreds of scien-
tific and common names, creating a maddening confusion for naturalists, 
 7. Munro, Dana G. Post-war problems in our Latin-American relations. The American Political Sci-
ence Review. 1944; 38 (3): 521-530 (522)
 8. There are some works on cooperation in public health during the years mentioned; see n. 
1 and n. 2.
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traders, physicians and historians. In 1998, a review concluded that in the 
scientific literature there are 330 specific names for Cinchona, while only 
23 are accepted as distinct species 9. The original distribution of the quinas 
ranges from central Bolivia to northern Colombia and Venezuela, at altitudes 
from 600 to over 3,000 meters. Only C. pubescens is found outside of the 
Andes, in the mountains of Costa Rica and the northern coast of Venezuela. 
The migration of Cinchona to new latitudes began in the 1860s, and 
nowadays the plant is found in all tropical regions. The Dutch succeeded 
in creating a highly productive species, C. ledgeriana, and from the early 
twentieth century, South American production stagnated while the Dutch 
broke records every year for the concentration of alkaloids in the plants 
they produced. Java (a Dutch colony) was the site of 90 to 95 per cent of 
the world’s production and the Dutch quinine processors also held a mono-
poly due to their exclusive purchasing contracts with Javanese producers. 
Different manufacturers raised claims against the Dutch monopoly to little 
effect: Dutch production dominated the market and producers determined 
prices and destroyed any bark whose quinine content was less than four 
per cent. Other countries attempted to change this imbalance by creating 
substitutes via artificial synthesis and encouraging the establishment of 
plantations, especially from the 1920s. But it was the Second World War 
that led to renewed efforts in this respect.
3. The War and the need for raw materials
As Japan extended its conquests in Asia, the United States inventoried 
its reserves of strategic raw materials. If in 1938 there were those who 
suggested that the country look south for new supplies, by 1941 politi-
cians, businessmen and scientists recognized this as an inevitable strategy. 
Cinchona bark, for example, was imported almost exclusively from Dutch 
colonies in Southeast Asia, but Latin America had a reservoir of this and 
other strategic minerals and plants. 
As Cinchona bark was a high priority product (along with antimony, 
chromium, manganese, nickel, quartz, tin, manila fiber, rubber and silk), 
 9. Andersson, Lennart. A revision of the genus Cinchona (Rubiaceae-Cinchoneae). New York: 
Memoirs of the New York Botanical Garden, 1998.
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the United States government worked to ensure its reserves and prevent 
the enemy from doing likewise 10. The political objective was evident in a 
letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to a National Defense Council advisory 
committee: 
«Because markets for forty percent of the normal exports of Latin Ame-
rica have been lost due to the war, there is grave danger that in some of these 
countries economic and political deterioration may proceed to a point where 
defense of the western hemisphere would be rendered much more difficult 
and costly [...] One thing we can do is to give sympathetic consideration to 
Latin American products in the procurement of strategic and critical material 
for the defense program [...] When buying in foreign markets for defense 
needs, it is my earnest desire that priority of consideration be given to Latin 
American products and I so request» 11.
After Pearl Harbor, the United States called an urgent meeting in Rio 
de Janeiro, where the bases for hemispheric cooperation were laid. In the 
future, movies, fashion, magazines, music, etc., were to be exclusively from 
the U. S., and measures would be taken to discourage imports from other 
countries 12. Production was monopolized, and the extraction and agricultural 
production of complementary products, such as Cinchona, were promoted. 
Actions were taken to make sure that countries like Peru, Nicaragua and 
Haiti reduced the area devoted to non-complementary products, such as 
cotton. For example, Peru would be guaranteed the sale of its entire cotton 
crop if it was less than 155 thousand hectares. Additionally, the country 
would receive a reward for every one per cent reduction in land under 
cotton production 13.
To negotiate conditions with the complex mosaic of Latin American 
nations, the United States had something that all wanted: money for granting 
loans and purchase of their products. So the northern nation began to give 
 10. Beals, Carleton. The coming struggle for Latin America. New York: Halcyon House; 1940.
 11. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Letter to Chester C. Davis. Washington DC, Sep 27, 1940. National 
Agricultural Library. USDA History Collection. Box 1.2/25, Section VII, Series I, subseries 2, 
Documentary Files, 1907-1982 (bulk 1939-1949).
 12. Scotten. Airgram to The Secretary of State, American Embassy. Aug 23, 1944. National Archives 
at College Park. Box 15; Records of the United States Commercial Company Field Preclusive 
Operations File 1942-45, Entry 207; RG 234.
 13. Mensaje del Presidente del Perú, Doctor Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, al Congreso Nacional, el 
28 de jul de 1942 [Quoted on June 30, 2007]. Available at: http://www.congreso.gob.pe/
museo/mensajes/Mensaje-1942.pdf 
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credit, with major restrictions, aimed at obtaining certain raw materials. 
Latin American countries accepted the loans and the non-refundable aid, 
and created institutions to receive the money, directed by US staff, while 
also creating the laws necessary to permit access to products. The US go-
vernment also put large-scale institutional machinery into motion: some 
institutions and companies were created ad hoc, while others were changed 
to suit the economic war. There were institutions for controlling credits, for 
creating agricultural development stations and promoting complementary 
products, for the development and purchase of products, for trade controls, 
for public health intervention, for propaganda and rehabilitation, for the 
lend-lease of war materials, etc. In Latin America, all of these institutions 
were coordinated by the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and 
Cultural Cooperation, created a few years before, in 1938.
The operation involving Cinchona bark and its alkaloids went to a special 
agency, the Defense Supplies Corporation (DSC), but some aspects were 
delegated to corporations, experimental stations (managed by the USDA) 
and other research and education institutions. Universities, laboratories, 
industries, private companies and pharmaceutical companies participated 
directly or indirectly. The aim was to monopolize the market through 
strategies such as blockades and black lists. A key strategy was the use of 
exclusive purchasing agreements, with loans and some technology transfer 
in the form of technical assistance and genetic material, but not in the latest 
technologies. According to the assistant director of the Office of Foreign 
Agricultural Relations (OFAR), Latin America
«must continue on to a new era. An era when hundreds of merchant ships will 
carry rubber, drugs, fibers, oils and herbs from south to north —and take back 
increased amounts of automobiles, tractors, plows, sewing machines, shirts, 
shoes. Many other things will be traded, in that era when the new products 
of the Americas will more nearly complement each other» 14.
 
But loans were not a guarantee: it was crucial to control how the money 
would be invested. Latin American governments were good partners, with an 
enormous agricultural frontier and the desire to collaborate; and in technical 
 14. Agriculture in the Americas, Interview with Dr. Earl N. Bressman, Office of Foreign Agricultural 
Relations, Sep 11, 1941, Transcribed. National Archives at College Park. Box 1479; Records of 
the Division of Agriculture General Correspondence (E-136); RG 229.
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terms, they were as reliable as an old-fashioned US peasant. So along with 
the money came agronomists, botanists, economists, chemists, experts in 
soil conservation and foresters. US science was aimed at transforming the 
entire landscape and the management of more than 100 products.
Never before had United States government agencies and companies 
enjoyed so many privileges and concessions as they did during the war. In 
several countries, such as Haiti, Bolivia and Ecuador, specific institutions 
were created to channel the loans. The way institutions would function was 
determined by laws written in Washington. In 1942, after a successful effort 
in Haiti, Ecuador established the Ecuadorian Development Corporation 
(EDC) with a loan from the Eximbank. The same occurred in Bolivia with 
the Bolivian Development Corporation. The report on the corporation 
and the development plans for Ecuador had two parts: in the first were the 
emergency programs that the United States considered of utmost urgency. 
This part of the report —the Foreword— was not shared with Ecuador. In 
fact, instructions to that effect, included in the forward, read as follows: 
«The foreword should be excluded from the report submitted to the Ecua-
dorian Government» 15.
The fate of the EDC was planned in Washington D.C. by representatives 
of Eximbank, the Board of Economic Warfare, the State Department, the 
OFAR, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the 
Soil Conservation Service. Ernest G. Holt, leader of the economic mission 
to Ecuador, said that the government of that Andean nation was open to 
making all necessary legal changes, including those permitting the creation 
of monopolies. Participants at that meeting agreed that «the Ecuadorian 
officials would agree to anything in principle, but that the types of arrange-
ments foreseen would not be carried out over a period of years» 16. In other 
words, the short term nature of the program was clear from the beginning 
to the planners in Washington.
Holt’s plan for Ecuador, like Melvin Bohan’s plan for Bolivia, was to 
build roads, draw labor from the mountains to the frontier to be opened 
 15. Ecuadorian Economic Resources Mission. Preliminary production plan and cost estimate for 
large scale rubber and abaca production in Ecuador under a national corporation. Ecuadorian 
Economic Resources Mission; 1942.
 16. Minutes of Meeting held in Mr. Wheeler`s Office, Mar 31, 1942. National Archives at College Park. 
Box 10; Records of the United States Commercial Company, General Country File 1942-48, 
Entry 200; RG 234.
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and develop sources for the species to be planted. One aide criticized the 
establishment of large plantations of Cinchona, rubber and other products if 
the project was ultimately to be executed by small farmers, but his opinion 
went no further than the minutes. The governments were to provide land 
and export privileges. Technical and administrative posts would be domi-
nated by US personnel, so the Eximbank could control the corporations.
Both from the viewpoint of its contemporaries and in retrospect, 
the EDC was a corrupt institution concerned only with the short term 17. 
Although the work was mainly done on the coast, an expensive office was 
set up in Quito and then-President Carlos Arroyo del Río was the first to 
ask for a job for his son, a request subsequently made by other influential 
ministers of the time. Staff operated at lightning speeds, dedicating themsel-
ves exclusively to the production of war materials and neglecting those that 
would have been of permanent interest. The money was spent quickly and 
the debt increased: the original loan for the EDC amounted to $5 million; 
by July 1944 it had increased to over $35 million 18.
4. The quest for Cinchona in the Andes 
What is especially unique about Cinchona production promoted during 
World War II, as compared to previous exploratory efforts, is the huge 
number of scientists involved; the Cinchona Program required not only 
agronomists for agricultural testing and improving, but also the immediate 
participation of botanists, foresters and chemists. 
By the time the United States returned to the Andean forests and to 
the old Cinchona plantations of the American continent, the only country 
that had experienced a resurgence of the bark industry was Bolivia, which 
shortly before had opened a large national quinine factory. In addition, in 
Guatemala, the pharmaceutical company Merck & Co. had been experi-
 17. Ecuador, Ministerio de Economía. El Ministerio de Economía y la Corporación Ecuatoriana de 
Fomento. Presentación de documentos comprobatorios de las gestiones del Ministerio en 
defensa de los intereses nacionales. Quito: Ministerio de Economía, Talleres Gráficos Nacio-
nales; 1945.
 18. Gobierno del Ecuador. Ratifícanse los convenios suscritos en Washington. Decreto n.º 1639 del 
4 de noviembre de 1943, Registro Oficial n.º 953, p. 6174-6175.
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menting with the plant for close to a decade and encouraged by the US 
government, as a strategy to get rid of the Dutch monopoly. 
The plan for Latin America was divided into three main parts: 
1)  to develop all sites with commercial quinas and control their price to 
prevent speculation and maintain a stable situation in the long term; 
2)  to develop plantations that could compete with the Kina Bureau 
(the Dutch monopoly) or any other group and ensure provisions 
in case of any emergency; 
3)  to train people in producing countries to, at the end of the missions, 
take over the industry with the nominal help of the United States. 
Part of the plan was to promote the use of quinine, atebrine and any 
other substitutes in the hemisphere 19.
As the goal was to stockpile all of the bark and its alkaloids, one of the 
first steps was to find US importers with knowledge of the Andean market. 
These companies began to purchase bark in the name of the DSC from 
June 1942, but to the US agency it seemed to be «an emergency within the 
emergency program», because the private companies lacked the authority 
to negotiate privileges. It was therefore necessary to sign agreements with 
each republic to develop the exploitation of the product in a major program, 
preventing the bark from getting into the hands of the Axis, and also en-
couraging local producers to engage with the market (they did not wanted 
to invest in something that had caused losses during the First World War 
due to the lack of scientific exploration, chemical analysis and control over 
prices, production and trade) 20. So agreements were gradually signed with 
the DSC assuming the duty and right to buy all of the bark provide tech-
nical assistance for the exploration of forests and establish plantations and 
factories. At the same time, agreements were made to establish agricultural 
experimental stations managed by USDA personnel, or to reinforce others 
 19. Report on Cinchona Program, Oct 22, 1942. National Archives at College Park; Box 10; Records 
of the United States Commercial Company relating to USCC Activities in Latin America 1942-
45; Entry 212; RG 234.
 20. Gardiner, Arthur E. (Director, Foreign Procurement Development Branch). Letter to James H. 
Head, Chairman, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Aug 29, 
1945. National Archives at College Park. Box 5; Records of the United States Commercial 
Company Administrative Subject File 1942-48, Entry 199; RG 234.
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already existent. Those stations would be used for performing experiments 
with Cinchona.
As much of Cinchona extraction/production depended on work in 
the forests, young US personnel with some experience in exploration (but 
not necessarily in the tropics) were selected. Everything was planned for 
their work, including compensation for injuries while fulfilling their duty 
in «insane» climates with unusual means of transport 21. In October 1942 
the first botanists arrived in Colombia: Francis Raymond Fosberg of the 
National Arboretum, and William Campbell Steere of the University of 
Michigan. They were the first of more than 20 botanists to be officially 
involved in the Cinchona Program. Colombia was the first of the six repu-
blics that signed an agreement with the DSC in relation to the production 
of Cinchona, in September 1942. The next were Peru, Guatemala, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador and Bolivia.
The role of the botanists was to find, identify and collect quinas and 
related plants that could be valuable for extraction or cultivation programs. 
Meanwhile, the foresters were to calculate the volume and propose the 
method for getting it to seaports. It was necessary to make an inventory 
of the existent species and varieties, as past knowledge had been a «trade 
secret», and a long time had passed since the end of the last Cinchona 
boom in Colombia.
Finding quinas was not difficult because they grow at defined altitude 
ranges and usually in patches of five to fifty individuals 22. The difficulty 
was finding the species with many alkaloids and then removing, drying and 
transporting the bark. Identification was a challenge because of the diversity 
of species and varieties, and the resultant diversity in alkaloid concentra-
tion. Some approaches were tried to solve this problem. For example, they 
used the Grahe test to find out whether the trees had alkaloids or not, but 
although this gave a «yes or no», it did not revealed «how much». To deal 
with this, a portable machine for checking quality in the field was invented 
in 1943. It was an ingenious system that could be used by untrained people, 
 21. Health precautions of Central and South America and the Caribbean Area, Prepared by the 
Medical Intelligence Branch, Preventive Medicine Division, S.G.O., US Army, Oct 10, 1941, and 
revised Jan 29, 1943. New York Botanical Garden Archives. Box 7; Series 8; William C. Steere 
Papers, 1927-1958.
 22. Steere, William Campbell. The Cinchona-bark industry of South America. The Scientific Monthly 
1945; 61 (2): 114-126 (124).
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and the first four units were sent to be tested, but little more is known about 
them, probably because they enjoyed little success: although the machines 
could solve the «how much» problem, they could not tell «which alkaloids». 
In the end, the best method continued to be the collection of samples and 
their analysis in a few permanent laboratories.
A rediscovery of major impact was that of C. pitayensis in the Colom-
bian Andes. This was relevant because in Colombia the pitayensis has more 
alkaloids than any other commercial species. As the range of this species 
continued to expand, it was presumed that this could also occur in Ecuador, 
so Steere went to that country in July 1943. He found pitayensis in Ecuador 
and was surprised that it was unknown. According to the scientist, this was 
because traditional knowledge claimed that the best Cinchona grows below 
1,700 meters above sea level 23. After the initial skepticism, he convinced 
the local people that this bark was good and they agreed to seek out other 
locations. By mid-1943 Ecuador was the second largest producer in Latin 
America, thanks to the «scientists in business» group which, according 
to Froelich Rainey, director of the mission in Ecuador, was what they had 
become 24.
But productivity did not mean quality, because the best bark went 
onto the black market and was smuggled. The Ecuadorian government 
lacked the technicians and the organization to control the industry and 
turned to the United States for assistance. Rainey eventually learned that 
an Italian company that processed Cinchona bark in Quito was sending it 
to the German and Italian armies in North Africa. With the government’s 
permission, a team was sent to a farm to be met by a colonel who was 
well-paid to organize a team that went to the páramo (highlands) where, 
at an altitude of 4,000 meters, they intercepted a pack of 14 mules. After 
that episode and an agreement with the factories, the problem was solved 
and large quantities of bark flowed to Guayaquil. 
Successful exploration depended heavily on logistical support, local 
guides and informants. It was considered good to have native guides but 
 23. Steere, William Campbell. The botanical work of the Cinchona Missions in South America. Sci-
ence. 1945; 101 (2616): 177-178 (177).
 24. Rainey, Froelich. Quinine hunters in Ecuador. National Geographic Magazine. 1946; 89 (3): 341-
363.
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not to rely entirely on their word 25. In theory, the local people would be 
trained to assist the scientists, but they ended up having to teach them 
how to move, where to go, and how to recognize plants. Botanist Wendell 
H. Camp was one of the explorers who most appreciated the help of his 
assistants. His three assistants were excellent models: Francisco Prieto, 
Manuel Giler and Henning Jorgensen. Prieto was one of a long line of 
Indian cascarilleros and 
«took pains to teach me the lore of bark fiber hunting, as well as the multitu-
dinous ways in which the bark was faked or diluted. He was a conscientious 
and excellent workman and completely to be trusted to operate alone. As a 
result he was often sent on special trips when it was not expedient to make 
up a full-scale expedition» 26.
Tropical nature was also a problem for all of them. Camp, for example, 
only loved nature when it was not «warm, rainy, muddy» 27.
Laboratories were also important. In the past, the quina business made 
and destroyed fortunes: the former when a forest with highly productive 
varieties was discovered, and the latter when a businessman was duped with 
adulterated or poor quality bark. The Dutch had homogenized the quality of 
quinas in Java, but with the return to the South American forests the topic 
became significant again. Success depended in large part on the ability to 
obtain quick and reliable analyses, so the DSC set up laboratories in Quito, 
Lima, Bogota and La Paz. The samples could arrive there as botanical co-
llections from the scientists, or could be taken from merchandise already 
harvested by individual peasants, communities or landowners. If it came 
from an untouched quina area, then the harvesting process began; if it was 
part of a stock already harvested, the price to pay could be determined. 
Without such analyses many headaches would have been suffered when 
the bark reached the factories, but they also served to make discoveries, 
such as the fact that at certain times of the year Cinchona could have 
more alkaloids, that alkaloids varied from one individual to another, that 
 25. Fosberg, F. Raymond. Manual de quinas colombianas, second edition. Bogotá: Foreign Economic 
Administration; 1944.
 26. Camp, Wendell H. Plant hunting in Ecuador. Memoirs of the New York Botanical Garden. 1952; 
8 (1): 1-24 (2).
 27. Daily Notes of Wendell Camp, Cuenca. New York Botanical Garden Archives. Box 1; Series 3, 
Field Trips and Expeditions; Wendell Holmes (Red) Camp Papers.
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there were size-alkaloid ratios and that the branches have fewer alkaloids 
than the trunk. However, the laboratory tests were not always reliable 28: 
the biggest fiasco happened in Colombia, where for a long period the test 
results gave negative errors ranging from six to eight per cent, resulting in 
serious losses for local producers.
5. Extraction and sale of Cinchona
After exploration came extraction, purchase, transport and export of 
the bark. This was done by foresters and businessmen who had to learn 
everything about the complex Cinchona extraction process and markets 29.
Extraction required the specialized labor of the cascarilleros, Indians 
who entered the forests to harvest the bark. To find quinas they had to 
walk through the forest or recognize the trees from an adjacent hill. They 
identified the quinas by sight, on the basis of the characteristics of a tree’s 
trunk and leaves. 
After identification, the trees were cut down, so they would grow again 
(those that were only peeled and left standing died) 30. Then they spent an 
hour removing the bark using machetes and knives. But the real challenge 
came later: carrying 70- to 100-pound loads over steep terrain to the dryer.
The bark was dried because when wet it was harder to transport and 
took up too much space in warehouses and on ships. When dried it lost 
between 70 and 75 per cent of its weight (if crushed the cost would have 
been reduced one hundred fold, but this idea was discarded because it 
increased the chances of adulteration) 31.
Traditionally, the drying occurred outdoors and although the casca-
rilleros and dealers knew that the sun damaged the bark, the technicians 
 28. Rainey, Froelich. Message to Paul H. Nitze, Mar 21, 1944. National Archives at College Park. Box 
14; Foreign Agricultural Service Reports from Agricultural Attaches relating to international 
agriculture conferences and congress 1931-1950, Entry 4A; RG 166.
 29. Margolis, Charles (Chief, Colombian Cinchona Division). Letter toWilliam C. Steere, Bogotá, Mar 
13, 1943, Board of Economic Warfare, American Embassy, Bogotá. New York Botanical Garden 
Archives. Box 7; Series 8; William C. Steere Papers, 1927-1958.
 30. Steere, n. 22, p. 125.
 31. Conversation between Snyder (S.B. Penick & Co.) and Gregory (BEW) on Cinchona grinding, 
Nov 14, 1942. Daily Negotiations Report, W. L. Gregory, Board of Economic Warfare. National 
Archives at College Park. Box 5; Records of the United States Commercial Company Admin-
istrative Subject File 1942-48, Entry 199; RG 234.
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noticed that the greatest loss of alkaloids was due to fermentation. So they 
built precarious dryers in the middle of the forest, in small clearings with a 
fire burning to speed up the drying process. Where there were large-scale 
operations, ovens that could hold several tons were built. 
The conditions around the extraction and drying points were appa-
lling. As Froelich Rainey testified, at around 1,500 meters above sea level, 
in the midst of smoke from the dryers, he saw Indians with malaria and 
other diseases that «could only be cured through exposure to the sun» 32. 
Though this is an impression based on empirical, rather than scientific, 
knowledge, it describes very well the working conditions in the forests 
where Cinchona was obtained.
Transport involved more than just removing the bark from the forests. 
After being transported to a collection point by porters, mules and donkeys, 
the dried bark was taken by truck or train to the ports of Callao, Guayaquil, 
Buenaventura and Barranquilla. It took about four months from the moment 
of purchase for the bark to reach the United States 33. The hardest part was 
reaching the main roads, a situation complicated by the labor problem: in 
places like Ecuador, the towns were a long way from the forests and were 
not popular destinations for workers. Bolivia had similar problems with 
all of its programs, and Guatemala lost workers during the coffee season. 
Hence, the colonization schemes undertaken by all governments. 
Much of the work was done by local agents who were responsible 
for organizing and supervising the harvest, drying, transport, storage and 
shipment. They were usually local businessmen with experience in dealing 
with plant products, who worked with scientists and farmers. The process 
was coordinated by a central agent, which was no guarantee. In Colombia, 
Charles Margolis, head of the mission from January 1943, had one-and-a-half 
million dollars to purchase Cinchona bark and quinine. Margolis was not 
a trustworthy character: he was found guilty of corruption and sentenced 
to a year and a day in prison for accepting a bribe. 
Eventually, between December 1941 and August 1945, the United Sta-
tes imported about 30 million pounds of dried bark from Latin America, 
 32. Rainey, Froelich. Quinine hunters in Ecuador. National Geographic Magazine. 1946; 89 (3): 341-
363 (356).
 33. Sanger, Quintin M. Procurement and development of strategic and critical raw materials. Na-
tional Archives at College Park. Several boxes in: Records of the Administrative Records of 
the Analysis Division, Historical Monographs Prepared by the Division, Entry 145; RG 169.
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to which must be added approximately 700 thousand ounces of processed 
alkaloids obtained using technologies already present before the War in the 
countries from which the product came. The United States never transfe-
rred technology to process alkaloids; it preferred to buy the bark, avoiding 
problems with product quality and possible future competition. Colombia 
was the largest supplier of bark, followed by Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru. In 
the following years the bark continued to be imported, reaching a total of 
over 40 million pounds between 1941 and 1947. 
6. Nurseries, plantations and alkaloids factories 
Planting programs were almost mandatory, otherwise Latin American 
countries would have been unlikely to accept the whole program, which also 
included the upgrading or installation of factories to process the alkaloids 34.
Old plantations in Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala were surveyed and 
new ones were promoted from Mexico to Bolivia. Though US personnel 
knew that the plantations would not be profitable in the long term, they 
argued that quina supplies could be depleted in the Andes, or that the Ja-
panese could destroy the Javanese plantations. The plants required ten to 
twelve years to grow, but poor quality alkaloids could be obtained in only 
three years, so plantations spread across the continent. Countries such 
as Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Haiti and Puerto Rico started to 
produce Cinchona 35.
The genetic material for plantations came from different sources: 
seeds taken from the Philippines and grown in Maryland, the Guatemalan 
material of Merck & Co., and the C. calisaya plantations of Bolivia and 
Peru. The aim of the intense seed traffic was to find the most productive 
variety and to standardize it.
The largest plantation projects were implemented in Guatemala and 
Costa Rica. At the first site, from 1934, Merck & Co. initiated a project with 
 34. Report on Cinchona Program, Oct 22, 1942. National Archives at College Park. Box 10; Records 
of the United States Commercial Company relating to USCC Activities in Latin America 1942-
45; Entry 212; RG 234.
 35. Banda C., Francisco. Quinine and substitutes. May 26, 1943. National Archives at College Park. 
Box 33; Records of the Defense Supplies Corporation Commodity Procurement File 1942-49, 
Entry 159; RG 234.
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C. ledgeriana seeds, but these efforts were modest until 1939, when the 
advent of the War motivated the foundation of Experimental Plantations 
Inc., a subsidiary of the pharmaceutical company that bought the El Naranjo 
farm. There was a nursery of Cinchona with 60 thousand square yards of 
beds where close to 15 million plants were grown, mostly C. pubescens and 
hybrids (the aim was to reach 48 million plants). In 1943 the first large-scale 
commercial plantation was located at El Naranjo: over 500 thousand acres. 
While El Naranjo was a large private provider in Guatemala, in 1943 
the Foreign Economic Administration took over a program that aimed to 
provide 300 million plants to producers. The site chosen was El Porvenir 
farm and its surroundings: there the FEA installed one of the best labora-
tories for the analysis of alkaloids, and the site became the largest nursery 
on the continent, ahead of El Naranjo. It employed about 2,000 people. The 
project was abandoned in late 1944 because the forests of South America 
were providing enough bark, and in 1949 the bilateral agreement ended. 
The Guatemalan government bought the property under the condition that 
the United States would have access to genetic material and that Guatemala 
would not give access to other countries 36.
The same thing happened in Costa Rica. With the support of Merck & 
Co. and the US government, the Experimental Plantations project started 
in 1942 with the purchase of farms 37. The results were not as good as in 
Guatemala, but by the end of the next year there were over half a million 
plants. In addition to private farms, the DSC signed a contract with the 
government of Costa Rica to lease 1,250 acres of the Isla Bonita farm to 
plant C. ledgeriana. Its official name was the American Quinine Plantation. 
With regard to the processing of alkaloids, some of the bark was di-
rected to local factories running on old technology, because the United 
States was not interested in encouraging the industry in the Andes: «Our 
purchase [of alkaloids] desirable only to clean up market and not to en-
 36. Wells, Milton K. (first Secretary of Embassy). Letter to The Secretary of State, on transmit-
ting exchange of notes with Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to certain 
assurances on the part of Guatemala concerning the future exploitation of Cinchona on 
the El Porvenir Plantation, Guatemala, Mar 16, 1949. National Archives at College Park. Box 
13; Foreign Agricultural Service Reports from Agricultural Attaches relating to international 
agriculture conferences and congresses 1931-1950, Entry 4A; RG 166.
 37. Rosengarten, Frederic. History of the Cinchona Project of Merck & co., inc. and Experimental 
Plantations, inc., 1934-1943. Rahway, N. J.: Merck & Co., inc.; 1944.
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courage production» 38. The agreements with Peru and Ecuador included 
a clause requiring the United States to finance a factory in each country, 
but this was finally abandoned in favor of plantations. At the meetings of 
the WPB and BEW, it was concluded that the establishment of factories in 
Latin America was equal to promoting competition with US factories, and 
the decision not to provide any technology prevailed despite the agreement 
to do so. At a meeting it was agreed that: «WPB is definitely committed to 
a policy of preventing us from assisting Latin American countries in setting 
up extraction plants» 39.
7. The end of the Cinchona Program 
The end of the war brought consequences for raw material extraction and 
agricultural cooperation programs. In the case of Cinchona, its termination 
converged with the recovery of plantations in Southeast Asia, the develo-
pment of synthetics, and the fact that by June 1944 the United States had 
enough antimalarial products to last until 1947 40. In Ecuador, botanical 
director Steere was not sorry: in July 1944 he was highly disillusioned and 
had amoebic dysentery and malaria. By April 1945 the last botanist in 
Ecuador was Camp, who remained there much to his regret 41. In Colombia, 
around January 1945, with the invasion of the Philippines and the end of 
the war in the Pacific, the office was ordered to close 42.
 38. Crowley, Adler and Cone. Letter to Rainey, Mar 30, 1944. National Archives at College Park. Box 
104; Records of the Bureau of Areas of the Pan American Branch, Pan American Records Stat. 
item 384; RG 169.
 39. Conversation between representatives of the WPB and the BEW, Keith G. Cone, Daily Negotia-
tions Report, Board of Economic Warfare, Feb 22, 1943. National Archives at College Park. Box 
5; Records of the United States Commercial Company Administrative Subject File 1942-48, 
Entry 199; RG 234.
 40. Taylor, Walter H. Memorandum to Howard J. Trueblood, on Background material on Cinchona 
production in Latin America, collected from Sources Available to the North and West Coast 
Division, Feb 10, 1945. National Archives at College Park. Box 14; Foreign Agricultural Service 
Reports from Agricultural Attaches relating to international agriculture conferences and 
congresses 1931-1950, Entry 4A; RG 166.
 41. Camp, Wendell. Letters to William Steere: La Cuenca (otherwise known as The Hole), Feb 24 
1945, and Quito, Ap 14 1945. New York Botanical Garden Archives. Box 5; Series 8; William 
C. Steere Papers, 1927-1958.
 42. General Progress Report, Colombia Cinchona Division, Oct 24 1945. National Archives at College 
Park. Box 981; Records of the Administrative Records of the Analysis Division, Entry 165; RG 
169.
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By 1945 purchases continued (without new exploration), but on Au-
gust 12 an urgent telegram arrived in Quito ordering the termination of 
the program by November 30. Anything that could not be shipped before 
that date would not be bought 43. As for quinidine, which by that time had 
become the priority alkaloid, the order was to obtain as much bark with 
quinidine as possible. 
The agreements ended in November, accounts were closed, debts were 
paid, and the Cinchona Program balance sheets end on that date. There 
was a strategy to get rid of some bark instead of sending it to the US pro-
cessing factories; it is known that 23,040 pounds of bark were destroyed in 
August 44. Although the amount is large, it would not be the first time that 
the medicine was reduced to ashes: for years the Kina Bureau had bought 
and destroyed South American bark just to remove it from the market. At 
the end, through the Cinchona Program the United States imported about 
40 million pounds of dry bark, a figure that does not include antimalarials 
processed in Latin American factories.
In 1948, with the synthetic atebrine and chloroquine reigning as an-
timalarial products, the South American bark was still processed in the 
United States. The pharmaceutical companies advised that the controls 
should be relaxed only when the Kina Bureau no longer represented a 
monopoly threat; this is why, when leaving the plantations of Guatemala 
and Costa Rica, contracts signed with the US government prohibited these 
countries from cooperating with foreign powers. The quinine industry, 
so highly promoted before, showed its true unsustainable face with the 
exit of the US agencies. But even when protectionism had ended in the 
Andean countries, some people continued promoting the cultivation and 
processing of the plant.
 43. Carr, Alfred B.; McDermott, Peter A. Telegram to Embassy, Quito, Aug 9, 1945. National Archives 
at College Park. Box 104; Records of the Bureau of Areas of the Pan American Branch, Pan 
American Records Stat. item 384; RG 169.
 44. Bogren, A. M. (Cinchona Representative). Memorandum to P. A. McDermott, Chief, General 
Commodities Division, Bureau of Supplies, Foreign Economic Administration, Sep 13, 1945. 
National Archives at College Park. Box 11; Records of the United States Commercial Company 
General Country File 1942-48 1942-48, Entry 200; RG 234.
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8. Epilogue
One aspect that stands out regarding the Cinchona program is the imme-
diate purpose of US intervention in Latin America during the Second World 
War, namely, to stimulate the production of strategic raw materials hitherto 
concentrated in Southeast Asia. Although since 1939 it was known that 
the plantations and production programs would be temporary 45, a double 
discourse was disseminated while a model of dependence on agricultural 
production and raw material exportation in exchange for loans and tech-
nology was consolidated.
The United States sought to coordinate inter-American trade in order 
to defend and unify the economies of the American nations. The idea was 
to use surplus, absorb stocks, grant loans, expand strategic and comple-
mentary products for the war, offer preferential rates, etc. That boom led 
to a change from Latin American dependence on European technology 
to a dependence on technology, money and cultural products from the 
United States. Once immersed in the dynamic, Latin American countries 
would have to borrow money to stimulate the discovery of new products, 
clear the forests and purchase machinery and agricultural inputs. When 
the emergency programs ended, only a few acknowledged in public that 
they might have introduced unnecessary crops. 
Scientists, with the support of businessmen, attorneys, diplomats, 
etc., promoted the extraction of forest products and the expansion of the 
agricultural frontier on a scale never seen before, mobilizing workers to 
areas with problems related to transportation, food and disease. Scientists 
planned this occupation of the newly opened areas and identified the crops 
to be produced; in doing so, they created new forms of relationship with 
nature. In the end, they were successful in directing the efforts of the Latin 
American republics towards complementary products that the United States 
was unable to produce at home. 
This intervention went beyond the forest extraction and agricultural 
fields. The policy of selling partial technology, or of conditioning loans to 
the purchase of United States technology, became common practices despite 
sporadic resistance displayed by Latin American nations 46.
 45. Newcomb, Robinson. The United States and Southeast Asia’s strategic products. Far Eastern 
Survey. 1939; 8 (8): 87-94.
 46. Galeano, Eduardo. Las venas abiertas de América Latina. Madrid: Siglo XXI; 2003 (1971), p. 316.
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In the nineteenth century, technology enabled the British to conquer 
Africa and Asia, with steam boats, quinine and weapons 47, and in the twen-
tieth century, the United States did the same with roads, machinery, seeds 
and a loan system with the promise of purchase. Science also provided, as 
in the nineteenth century, an intellectual justification for imperialism: in 
this case it was that of inferior technology, a «primitive agriculture» that 
needed «assistance» and «cooperation». With republics open to any recom-
mendation, imperialism regarding raw materials was easily implanted. As has 
been noted above, science was «an effective instrument of peace» 48, and the 
Cinchona Program illustrates very well how the «North-Americanization» 
of scientific endeavors in Latin America occurred in all fields, from botany 
to soil science and medicine.
Of course, this is not to say that the United States had the same agen-
cy that the Spanish in Latin America, the French in the Ivory Coast, the 
Germans in Tanganyika, the Dutch in Java, or the British in Ceylon. But 
it is equally impossible to claim that the playing field was a level one, that 
relations were established between equals in terms of power. Undoubte-
dly, the United States could not simply impose agricultural or extraction 
policies in Latin American countries, but in the end, in most cases, that 
was what happened. US agencies planned the agricultural development of 
these nations, the frontier to be opened, and the products to be developed. 
In the case of Cinchona, Bolivia was the only nation that did not accept 
US rules, but in the end it had to agree to sell its Cinchona to the United 
States. If it is true that, historically, US imperialism is much clearer in the 
Caribbean basin than in the Andean countries, it is also true that relations 
during World War II with those nations are based on a large dose of implicit 
or explicit imperial threats. 
Intervention served to test trade strategies from a State perspective, 
for example, by extending credit and determining how the loans would be 
used. As in the African context, in Latin America «development» was tested 
in the social, agricultural, environmental and other spheres. 
As for local scientists and science, technocrats created institutions to 
advise the government on new production, and other institutions arose, 
such as agricultural experiment stations (some directly controlled by the 
 47. Headrick, Daniel R. The tools of empire: technology and European imperialism in the nineteenth 
century. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1981.
 48. Miller, n. 5.
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United States) and research and education sites, such as the Instituto In-
teramericano de Cooperación Agrícola (IICA) in Costa Rica. They were 
excellent platforms for taking the tropics by storm. Latin American scien-
tists welcomed, disseminated and consolidated the model of US economic 
botany, and sustained the idea of opening the agricultural frontier and 
producing crops for export. 
As for the visiting scientists, who emulated the naturalists who had 
traveled across America centuries before, their travels provided excellent 
training as many were unfamiliar with tropical plants in situ 49. On a more 
technical level, alkaloid extraction led to technological innovations, and 
it was the pressure to obtain synthetic drugs which led to extensive bio-
medical studies 50. Furthermore, the identification of Cinchona and other 
Rubiaceae presented challenges that were overcome through new chemical 
and histological analyses. Wendell H. Camp used this data to open a re-
search field in a 1949 article in which he proposed a taxonomy based on 
biochemical characteristics. In a letter to Standley, he concluded: «I fear 
that if the analysis of field samples is soon to be correlated with botanical 
specimens your days of peace and comfort will be over» 51. What he meant 
was that taxonomy based solely on morphological characteristics would 
have to change to include molecular analysis. Science in the field, coupled 
with laboratory work, was the key to the development of life sciences in 
the twentieth century, and also to that of the imperial enterprise. 
The war missions strengthened the role of US scientists and agencies in 
the imaginations of Latin American nations: they became experts charged 
with determining paths of research and the path of development that all 
would embrace a few years later with Truman’s call for development. They 
also consolidated the belief in the ability of United States technology to 
solve their production problems. That technology would be introduced at 
the expense of local initiatives. 
US technical assistance spread around the globe, and scientists began 
to occupy diplomatic positions and scientific cooperation became more 
 49. Wiggins, Ira. Letter to William Steere, Oct 20, 1945. New York Botanical Garden Archives. Box 
8; Series 8; William C. Steere Papers, 1927-1958.
 50. Wiselogle, Frederick Y. A survey on antimalarial drugs 1941-1945, 2 vols. Michigan: J. W. Ed-
wards; 1946; Slater, Leo B. War and disease: biomedical research on malaria in the twentieth 
century. Piscataway NJ: Rutgers University Press; 2009.
 51. Camp, Wendell Holmes. Letter to Paul C. Standley, Cuenca, Aug 26, 1944, New York Botanical 
Garden Archives. Steere Papers, Box 7.
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than simply a cultural interchange: in the post-war years, it was also related 
to technological development, economic growth and national security 52. 
That is how botany, forestry and other sciences once again came to serve 
the imperial project.
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